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Religion in a Communist Consumer Society:
The Case of Kadar's Hungary
by Leslie Laszlo
Professor Laszlo is a member of the
Department of Political Science at
Concordia University in Montreal.
He is the author of several studies
on church-state relations in Hungary.
The following essay is a somewhat
abbreviated version of a paper read
in New York City at the August 1980
meeting of the Association for the
Sociology of Religion.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Janos Kadar enunciated his famous slogan "Whoever is not against us
1
is with us" and embarked on a national reconciliation, the relationship with the
churches and their adherents became an important issue for the Hungarian communists.
Vis-�-vis the Roman Catholic Church, to which the overwhelming majority -- some
2
seventy per cent - - of Hungarian religious believers belong, the rapprochement was
nothing less than spectacular.

After nearly twenty years of severe repression of

religion and church activity, accompanied by incessant "cold \'lar" type propaganda
against the Vatican, the Hungarian government was the very first in the Communist Bloc
to sign an agreement with the Holy See in 1964, preceding even Yugoslavia.

And again

in 1977 J�nos Kid�r was the first head of a ruling Communist Party to pay an official
state visit to Pope Paul V I.

In fact, today spokesmen of the Hungarian government

maintain that church-state relations in Hungary are mutually satisfactory and could
3
even serve as a model for the other socialist states.
While this claim is certainly exaggerated since it ignores the continuing griev
ances of the Church (such as the severe restrictions placed on religious instruction,
the interference of the State Office for Church Affairs with church government, dis
crimination against believers in university admissions and in certain occu�tions,etc.)
the puzzle remains, why would a professedly atheistic regime which is obliged by its
Marxist-Leninist ideology to fight religion, that "opiate" of the people, go out of
its way to reassure its own people and the world at large of its sincere desire to
1ive in harmony \'dth the churches and work together with the religious believers in
the building of socialism.

Even a tentative answer to this question would have to take

into account the multifaceted exigencies of both domestic and international politics,
which forced even such giants of the Communist world as the Soviet Union and China to
permit some manifestations of religion and church 1ife on their territory.

To be sure,

it is not difficult to find certain features in Kad,r's church policies which are meant
for the "show" abroad, to enhance his image and to gain favourable publicity for his

- 2 countr.y.

However, a careful reading of the pertinent documents, declaration and

speeches by party and government representatives leaves the impression that in this
case foreign propaganda is only incidental: the real target is the people at home,
more precisely the millions of believers in the population who were for a long time
antagonized and alienated by the crude anti-religious propaganda and harassment of
their churches.
The recurring theme in these pronouncements reaching out toward the believers
is that, regardless of ideological differences, religious people should not feel like
outsiders in the new socialist society; in fact, they are warmly welcome insofar as they
are willing to cooperate in the building of socialism. It should be noted that in the
past this invitation "to help in the common task of building socialism" was issued to
gether with a caveat,namely that peaceful coexistence with religious believers did not
mean approval of their "superstitions", or even indifference towards them.

Religion

was to be tolerated but it was still regarded as a retrograde, anti-humanistic world
view, breeding false consciousness, diverting attention from the class struggle, pro
pagating perverted moral values which had to be combatted. by the Communists.

In this

vein, simultaneously with the rapprochement toward the churches, the regime intensified
the ideological training of party cadres and introduced new obligatory courses in
Marxism-Leninism at all levels of public education while religious instruction was prac
tically eliminated from the schools.

Apparently, they wanted the masses of believers

to thrive and work hard for the state, but they did not want religion to flourish, as
Mgr. Jozsef Cserhati, the Bishop of P�cs, complained.
lying rationale was in all this:

One can surmise what the under

namely, since there are still millions of believers,

let's utilize their brains and brawn, but concentrate all effort on winning over and
holding on to the youth, so that

�he new generation will grow up in the belief system

of scientific Marxism-Leninism, uncontaminated by religious superstitions.
More recently, however, a subtle shift has occurred in this reasoning.

There

has been a relatively sudden and rather surprising discovery to the effect that religion
is not only an annoying habit cum superstition of the elderly and ignorant who, inciden
tally, can be quite decent people and good workers, but that religion might provide man
with a code of ethics based on moral values which are sorely needed in present day Hungary.
Thus, for example, last year on the occasion of a press conference in Vienna, held by
Secretary of State Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office for Church Affairs, the re
presentatives of the foreign press were given copies of a study by Miklos in which he
admitted that "the Church can also carry out a positive role within socialistic society,
such as in the defence of peace, in the promotion and encouragement of national unity
with socialist content - for which the development of an atmosphere of trust is espe
cially important - in defending societal and personal property, in spreading the ideas of
humanism, in love for the people, in the fight against crime, in the promotion of the .

3 progressive traditions of the national inheritance and of cultural values (e.g. in matters
concerning the protection of art treasures, the care of sacred scholarly collections,

historical studies) ...

Moreover, according to Miklos, it would be wrong to underestim.ate

the influence of religious faith 11in the private life of individuals, in interpersonal
relationships, in the defence of certain moral norms and critical views of other norms
_ . 11

4

On.e might suspect, although tangible proof is lacking, that this change in per
ception and attitudes toward religion might be due, at least in part, to some cold stat
istics which were brought to the attention of the authorities by the soc·iologists wor:k ing
on the long neglected discipline of the sociology of religion in Hungary.

Here it should

be mentioned that the field, at least in Hungary, remains the reserve of �1arxist scholars.
When the Catholic Church wanted to establish a Pastoral Institute to engage in sociolo·.gical research within the framework of the Catholic Theological Academy of Budapest,
5
government permission was denied.
Among the sparse information emanating from the professionals, but also from the
1churches, one can find some rather interesting data.

From these I have selected a few

samples to illustrate the gravity of the dilemma in which the Communists find themselves
when dealing with religion and the churches in Hungary.

Due to the dearth of data for

the other religious denominations, the focus of this paper will be the Catholic Ch urch.

In

·any case, Catholicism is predominant in Hungary to such an extent that in common parlance,
and even in government pronouncements, simple reference to 11the Church11 always means the
�atholic Church.
:Religion - an important societal factor
The first thing which had been confirmed by statistical findings is that religion has
eretained a strong hold on Hungarian society, despite over thirty years of Communist domination.
In fact, there are still more Christian believers in Hungary than Marxist-Leninists.
Actually, the census figures after 1949 do not show the religious preference of the
population.

The various denominations give often widely differing figures of their estim

ated adherents.

There is a general agreement only as far as to admit that the world wide

ttrend of secularization also affected Hungary and as a result the number of believers mad
greatly declined.

In the case of the Catholic Church the optimistic view is t hat while its

11osses might reach between one and two millions, there are still about five to six min ions
llf Catholics in the overall population of ten million.

In a thorough and detailed stutly,

published in the Catholic monthly Vigilia, a comparison of the vital statistics of the civil
register for the year 1971 with the corresponding parish records throughout the country in
every single locality yielded the following results:

on the occasion of the three foremost
events of life -- birth, marriage, and death -- a surprisingly high percentage of the total.

population continues to call upon the Church to administer the sacraments of baptism (60. 5%),
holy matrimony (37. 3%)- here it must be noted that divorcees cannot be remarried in the

·

- 4 Catholic Church), and last rites (60. 8%).

6

If one would aqd to these figures the likely

number of Protestants who take their infants to the. baptismal font, marry in church, and
give their dead a Christian burial, one could say that in today•s Hungary between 70. and
80 per cent of the population retain at least some ritual ties with their respective
churches.
In the case of the above thr�e ceremonies one should take into account, of course,
family pressure, local customs, and the sheer weight of tradition.
should not take the high figures as indices of true religiosity.

In other words, one
�hen in a poll a care

fully selected cross section of the public was asked, 11are you a religious person?11 of the
9,000 people over 20 years of age only 46. 0% replied in the affirmative, 46. 6% said no,
5. 8% could not d�cide, and 1. 6% did not reply. 7
Statistics about practicing Christians are even less impressive.

In Budapest out of

more than a million Catholics only about lOO,OOO·go to church on Sunday, and only between
ten and twelve per cent of the children are prepared for first communion.

Overall, it is

said that the number of committed, practicing Catholics is no more than about a million
8
Of
and a half for the entire country, i. e. about fifteen per cent of the population.
course, this is still a respectable figure which would compare favourably with many Western
societies, and it still exceeds the membership of the Hungarian Socia�ist Workers Party
9
which numbers some 800,000.
Realization of this continuing· hold of religion on a large segment of the population
must have contributed to the ideological formula arrived at by the second colloquium organ
ized by the East European practitioners of the sociology of religion at Prague in 1968.
The participa �ts concluded tha� religiosity is a social phehomenon which survives even in a
socialist society, therefore one must include the believin·g masses and their churches in the
program of building socialism, not exclude them.

Simultaneously, the need for a Marxist
10
Christian dialogue and for further sociological studies of religion was recognized;

The social ills of a consumer society
What lent special urgency to the call for a united effort to build socialism was the
realization that there were, indeed, great obstacles on the road toward a better society.
During the 196o•s, when Kiddr•s Hungary after many years of penury entered a degree of
prosperity, and when many of the shackles restricting the acquisition of private property
were removed by.the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) and the doors seemed to have opened for the
average man to strike it rich and join the affluent nouveau riche of socialist Hungary,

para

llel with the rapid decline of religion a vulgar materialism increasingly took hold of large
segments of the populace whose chief goal in life became material possessions and_l! dolce
vita.

Few.of them, however, have striven to realize their dreams by hard work.

Popular
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belief, based on observation of easy-to-find notorious examples, says that there are better
and quicker ways to success and riches.

Corruption, the greasing of palms, cheating

on

the

job, embezzling, and stealing of public property became so widespread that it is almost ac
cepted as normal behaviour for smart folk.

At the same time those who cannot make it, sink

in the stupor of alcohol, absent themselves from work, often end up on skid row, o� commit
suicide.

The picture which the newly emancipated sociologists discovered and presented to

the public in journals and even in the daily newspapers, was truly shocking and certainly
beyond anything the Party and the government had cared to admit even to themselves.

After

all, no country, and even · less one which calls itself socialist, would want to brag about
such sorry records as having the lowest birthrate, but the highest rate of suicides in the
11
world,
and probably the worst problem of alcoholism: it is said that between half a
million to a million men and women are severely affected by alcohol, while about 150,000
12
can be regarded as alcoholics proper, among whom the male-female ratio is 5:3.
Work
discipline is almost non-existent and productivity is abysmally low.

These are the symp

toms of a seriously ill society, even if to the outside world Hungary presents the picture
of the show window of the Communist world, with its happy go-lucky people, considerable
degree of individual and artistic freedoms, and fully stacked magazine shelves, which even
its critics describe as "the merriest barracks in the Soviet camp".
Bishop Cserhati's challenge
This then was the somber background to the remarkable dialogue which took place in
1976/77 between the Party's chief ideologue and cultural czar, Deputy Premier Gyorgy Acz el
and the bishop of P�cs, Msgr. Jdzsef Cserhdti.

There is no place here to go into details

of their widely publicized exchanges; suffice to say that to Aczel's invitation to the
believers to join in the task of defending world peace and of building socialism, Bishop
Cserhati replied that if the regime wanted sincere cooperation, it should stop offending
the feelings of the believers by its constant attacks, and even ridicule, of their most
sacred convictions.

Why not, asked the bishop, end the deeply humiliating treatment of the

believers as "second class" citizens subject to various kinds of harassment and discrimin
ation.

Instead the government should aim at restoring their pride and self-esteem which

is so necessary for the good performance of any job, by openly acknowledging the positive
values of ethics and morality which Christian believers contribute to society.

This would,

of course, necessitate also the granting of greater freedom to the Church in its mission
to strengthen those values among the adults and inculcate them in the children in teaching
13
them the catechism of Christian faith and morality.
Cserh�ti's contention that religious believers do, in fact, follow moral precepts
to a higher degree than non-believers, is supported by the study carried out by a team from
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the Catholic Theological Academy of Budapest, cited above in connection with the data on
religious 'practice.

By taking the number of suicides, divorces, and abortions, and the

incidence of the use of oral contraceptives, and correlating these figures with the inten
sity of Catholic practice in each city and county, the researchers were able to establish

a significant negative correlation throughout the country, without exception, between these
two sets of data.

In a nutshell, their findings shovJ that where Catholicism is stronger,

the rate of suicides, divorce and abortion is definitely and significantly lower.

In the

case of oral contraceptives the correlation was found less significant - the pill is accepted
by Catholics with greater ease than abortion - but even there the indication is clear that
14
the use of contraceptives is less widespread a� ong Catholics.
The message is clear: in a
country beset by serious problems of suicide, family disintegration, and extremely loH birth
rate, and which is faced, as a consequence, with alarming labour shortage, Catholics are
apparently better equipped by their faith to cope with life's stresses and to accept family
responsibilities.

Thus they are fulfilling their duty and obligation to increase and stren

gthen the human potential of the socialist state better than others do.
One can assume that a similar discovery, namely, data showing positive correlation
between religiosity and moral behaviour that i� desirable from the point of view not only of
the chur� h but also of the government, might have been made also by Marxist socio�ogists;
however, as has often happened to their announced projects, publication did not follow.
Anyhow, it would be somewhat embarrassing for them to come out with such findings because,
assuming_ that the first statement, i.e. "religion enhances morality" was proven, then the
reverse must also hold, i.e. "the absence of religion has negative effect on morality".
What a Pandora's box for a true Marxist-Leninist to open!
Coming back to Bishop Cserh�ti's challenge, it is interesting to note that it was not
ignored, or rejected outright, as it would have been in the past.

In fact, the authorities

seem to have come around, at least halfway, to accepting his suggestion.

As I have already

shown in the beginning of my essay, Secretary of State Imre Mi�6s now talks about the
churches' role "in the defence of certain moral norms", their positive role within socialist
society "in their love for the people", "in defending societal and personal property", "in
the fight against crime", etc.

In similar vein Professor J6zsef Lukacs, the foremost phil

osopher of atheism in Hungary, the editor of Vilagossag, lecturing on "Churches and Rel i
giousness in Socialist Hungary" at the Political Academy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party, conceded that religion could perform a useful social function.

It is by no means a

negligible social force which "preserves certain moral principles", especially in the
of human and family relations. 15

r·ealm

To date this change of attitude, while significant, is still half-hearted and cannot
be regarded as unequivocally sincere.

A big stumbling block remains in the way of true re

conciliation and fruitful cooperation between church and state, arid this is the question of
the youth.

- 7 The youth
The overwhelming majority of all studies done by the Hungarian sociologists of
religion is focussed on the youth.

Their date show that the most rapid secularization,

the steepest decline in religiosity, has been registered among the young, especially
the students.

For example, according to the results of a poll taken among \•JOrking and

student youth between sixteen and twenty-five years of age, reported in the November
1968 issue of the widely read literary monthly Kortars, only 32% said that they believed
in God, one per cent was unsure, and 66 per cent described themselves as materialists.
Other inquirjes show even lesser figures, between 15 and 20 per cent of believers among
16
high-school and university students.
It seems that religiosity is in inverse ratio to the educational level and years
of schooling.

Thus by completion of junior high school, the percentage of children

still believing drops from the original 60 per cent in first year to 35.5 per cent.
By the time of graduation it is 21. 4 per cent; after that at the university it remains
17
fairly constant, between 18 and 20 per cent.
The Party takes a certain satisfaction in these results.

It even claims credit

for weaning away the youth from religion which it identifies with false consciousness
and unreal idealism, positively harmful to the development of the new socialist man.
In reality, the Communists have little reason for too loud a jubilation and self-con
gratulation.

The very same data show that the youth which abandoned its religious

heritage, did not automatically turn to the officially propagated Marxist-Leninist
belief system.

Far from it:

while the number of Marxist atheistic youth is estimated

to be 10-15 per cent at the maximum, the vast majority of young people in Hungary today,
well over 60 per cent in all polls that have been published, are found to be totally
indifferent, without any belief whatsoever, and if they call themselves 11materialists 11
18
that term has nothing to do with Marxist philosophy:
it simply means that they are

r

only interested n money and what money can buy, comfort, pleasure, and sex, in other
words what Marxists disdainfully describe as 11Vulgar materialism ...
If this were only an intellectual attitude or passing fad!

The sober truth is

that it is rather both the symptom and a self-perpetuating cause of the grave societal
ills already mentioned:

the low work discipline, alcoholism, disintegration of the

family, widespread corruption, theft of public property, and so on.

Of course, these

are not new phenomena (they have been deplored and castigated by the Party for years)
but now it turns out that these failings - once said to have been the remnants of
bourgeois-capitalistic society -- are even to a greater degree characteristic of the
young generation that has been educated and shaped by the socialistic system.

That this

is so has been demonstrated again by the data collected by sociologists and by the
"
.
.
.
lQ
merc11ess f1gures on grow1ng juven1le de11nquency. .

- 8 There are no secrets any more:

the Hungarian public is bombarded by a spate

of articles appearing in periodicals and in the daily press, by round-table dis-·
cussions on the radio and dramatic show� on TV depicting the nihilistic, cynical
hedonistic young people wearing jeans, playing rock music and dancing in discos, young
people whose only goal in life is to own a motorbike, or an automobile, and live the
sweet life of pleasure.
No compromise on the youth
Although Janos Kadar addressing the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party last spring himself complained about those young people who have "negative attitudes,
such as indifference, in the case of some people even cynicism, and the tendency to seek
an easy life",20 there is no admission of failure, nor a call for help addressed to the
churches.

The Communists stubbornly and desperately cling to th�ir faith that it is they

alone who should mold the young minds.

They still hope against all evidence that they

will succeed in educating the youth in the t�arxist-Leninist ideology and imbue them with
the supposedly superior morality of Communism.

In this case there seems to be no room

left .for compromise with the churches which also insist on their mission to win the souls
of.the young.

If anything, the shackles on religious instruction are tightened even

further while Communist indoctrination is intensified.

Thus, in spite of the official

assurances about the satisfactory church-state relations in Hungary, a muted tug-of-war
for the youth continues.
Enter the Pope
An interesting footnote:

Pope John Paul I I has now entered the debate.

In his

second letter to the Hungarian episcopate, dated Easter 1980, he called on the Hungarian
21
Catholics to insist on their right to have religious instruction in the public schools.
The effect of this move is certain to stir up controversy, upsetting the delicate balance
worked for by L�szl6 Cardinal L�iai since he became Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate
His policy has been not to insist on ihe legally assured rights of
parents and the Church to have religious instr�ction in the schools - this had become
of Hungary in 1977.

a hopeless endeavour - but instead to organize classes of catechism on church premises.
Although this "Sunday school" type activity h.as been also placed under strict control
by the state - the size of the classes, the frequency of the meetings, and the scope and
method of the teaching are all narrowly circumscribed and subjected to frequent inspection L�kai seems to have been confident that this route will prove more passable, and in any
case less irritating for the Communists and thus more easily tolerated by them than religion
in the public schools.

Whether the Pope•s call to the faithful is a sign of his displeasure

with the timidity of the Hungarian bishops (it was widely reported that Cardinal Wyszynski
reproached the Hungarian Primate for exactly that) or a skilful ploy to strengthen the

- 9 bishop's hand vis-a-vis the regime which places great value on its relations with the
Vatican, we do not know.

What effect it will have on the Hungarian situation, only

time will tell.
Conclusion
The thesis of this paper is admittedly tenuous:

the data are, as yet, too few to

be sufficient to speak of any radi�al change in Communist views and policies toward rel
igion and the churches in Hungary. However, just as the hard-pressed Stalin gratefully
accepted the moral and material help of the Russian Orthodox Church during the Great
Patriotic War, there are definite indications, as I have tried to show in this paper,
that the Hungarian Communists are beginning to appreciate the positive moral values of
Christianity in their combat against the "vulgar material ism" of today• s consumer society.
The time might be near when they will no longer be ashamed to call upon the churches for

help in their battle against the many ills plaguing their much vat,nted socialist society.
If indeed this is the direction in which church-state relations are heading, we might be
witnessing the beginnings of extremely interesting and important developments.
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